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Summary 
This thesis seeks to address how political risk influences investment in the agricultural sector 
in Norway. The agricultural sector is a particularly interesting case as it is highly affected by 
governmental intervention. Governance is aimed at establishing predictable and stable 
production terms, and an important question in this context is whether governance is able to 
reduce the overall risk faced by farmers. For example, the politically determined target prices 
for milk, aims at reducing the overall risk of dairy farmers, but they could also provide a false 
sense of security. A farmer in a free market will be exposed to price risk. A farmer in Norway 
will not be exposed to price risk in the same way because prices are more or less determined 
once a year in the agricultural negotiations. However, due to governmental intervention in 
Norway, the farmer will be more vulnerable to political risk than the farmer in the free 
market. One could therefore potentially argue that the overall level of risk is not reduced, but 
that the source of risk is different.  
In order to analyse the effect of political risk, I will look at aggregate investment in the 
agricultural sector and use two proxy variables for political risk. These proxies are the time-
period of a parliamentary election and the time-period where a new government is elected.  
The theoretical foundation of the thesis will make use of the real option approach in analysing 
the effect of political risk. Here the value of the real option is linked to uncertainty about the 
future political framework and the ability to delay an investment decision until this 
uncertainty is resolved. If political risk is an important risk factor, the farmer may use the 
option to wait until the outcome of the election is known. If so, investment should be lower in 
the time before an election or in the time before an expected change in government compared 
to the time afterwards. 
The empirical part of this thesis is based on data from the Norwegian quarterly National 
Accounts (Nasjonalregnskapet) published by SSB, Farm Account data (Driftsgranskningstall) 
and the Aggregated Accounts for Agriculture (Totalkalkylen for Jordbruk) both published by 
NILF. These data sources will be used in order to analyse if variations in risk impact 
investment and the datasets contribute to the analysis in different ways. The Norwegian 
National accounts give quarterly data on investment that makes it possible to analyse if there 
is a drop in investment in the quarters before an election The Aggregated Accounts allow us 
to analyse whether the type of investment and the depreciation rate influence the option value. 
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Farm Account data on the other hand; enable us to look at the effect of increased risk in one 
specific sector.  
The hypothesis that political risk influences investment has been tested with two different 
econometric specifications, given by the autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic 
(ARCH(1)) model and ordinary least square regression. The ARCH model specification 
measures if any of the dummy variables for risk influences the volatility of investment. The 
results indicate no conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis. The least square regression 
specification analyses whether political risk influences the investment level. While I do find 
support for the dummy variable on election of new governments on a 10 % significance level 
in the Farm Account dataset - the significance is weak and the results are not confirmed in 
other specifications.  
I find no conclusive evidence for political risk influencing neither the volatility of investment 
nor the investment level. This indicates that, given the data and the methods used in this 
study, political risk does not significantly influence producer behaviour in the agricultural 
sector. This could be interpreted as the agricultural sector being well regulated and that 
political conditions are relatively stable across different and changing governments, as well as 
over different party constellations in Parliament. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
In 2005, Flaten, Lien, Koesling, Valle, & Ebbesvik conducted a survey to analyse the 
perception of risk among organic and traditional farmers in Norway. The study showed that 
dairy farmers considered the risk associated with future subsidies to be more important than 
the risk of, for example fluctuating prices. Surveys can uncover how producers in the 
agricultural sector perceive risk, but we do not know whether this has an actual effect on 
producer behaviour or not. It might be that even though producers perceive political risk to be 
an important risk factor, this perception may not lead to an actual change in their behaviour. 
However, an increasing amount of evidence supports the general hypothesis that political risk 
influences investment decisions1.   
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it will establish a theoretical foundation for 
analysing the effect of political risk on economic behaviour. In this regard, the main novelty 
of this thesis is the application of the real option approach to investigate political risk in the 
agricultural sector. Second, it will test the hypothesis that political risk influences producer 
behaviour by looking at time-series data on investment.  
Hegrenes et al. (2008), Bergfjord & Brandt (2009), Bergfjord (2007) and Lien & Hardaker 
(2005) give important contributions on the effect of political risk on agriculture. In the NILF 
rapport, Risk exposure and Risk Management, by Hegrenes et al; attitudes towards risk and 
risk coping strategies in agriculture and aquaculture were analysed. The working paper by 
Bergfjord (2007) is a theoretical analysis of prediction markets as a toll tool for managing 
political risk. The model is theoretical and much research is needed before markets on risk 
can be used to spread risk in practice. The work by Bergfjord and Brandt (2009) reviewed the 
relationship between risk, regulation and rent seeking behaviour. This article studies how 
political risk affects rent-seeking behaviour. They find that there is an optimal level of risk 
where the marginal increase in risk is equal to the marginal reduction in the cost of lobby. 
Thus, some risk can be desirable because it may discourage rent seeking.  
                                                 
1 Alesina & Perotti (1996) show that uncertainty in the political-economic environment reduces investment. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, & 
Swagel (1992) have investigated cross-country differences between political instability and GDP per capita growth and find a positive 
correlation between government collapse and growth. Knack & Keefer (1995) show that indicators of uncertainties in property rights 
enforcement are negatively associated with private investment performance across countries.  
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The contribution of this thesis is to analyse if the risk perceived by farmers influences 
producer behaviour. While previous research has established that farmers believe political risk 
to be an important risk factor, it has not been established whether this perception has a real 
influence on their economic behaviour.  Production in the agricultural sector in Norway is in 
many ways regulated by government2. Hence, research on how political risk affects economic 
behaviour is important. No normative conclusion can be drawn based on this thesis. Even if 
one can establish that political risk does influence investment - that does not entail that policy 
should be implemented to reduce risk.  
 
1.2 Proxy variables for risk 
The perception of risk is unobservable. While many farmers can give examples of isolated 
incidences where they feel that the political framework has greatly influenced their economic 
behaviour - feelings are subjective perceptions and do not prove that the political framework 
has in fact had a quantifiable influence on their economic behaviour. To measure the impact 
of political risk on investor behaviour I will therefore need a proxy with exogenous variation. 
For this purpose, I have chosen to use the election of new governments and general elections. 
 
For a proxy to be valid, it should only influence the dependent variable through the proxy 
chosen. The proxies for political risk are general elections and the election of new 
governments. The proxies chosen represent the time-period3 (i.e. the quarter or the year) of 
the proxy variables. The question is therefore: will these time-periods be exogenous to the 
level of investment or can they influence investment in other ways than through farmers’ 
expectations. I would argue that they cannot. An election does not change what is happening 
here and now. It influences what might happen in the future. An election influences 
expectations through what a farmer thinks of what parties are saying in their campaigns, 
through what they believe will happen in the future or how the outcome of the election can 
influence future production. Elections therefore do not change what is happening today, they 
influence the farmers expectation of what might happen in the future. 
                                                 
2 See section 1.3 for more on political governance.  
3 Information on general elections and election on new governments has been found on 
http://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_over_Norges_regjeringer ;  http://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stortingsvalg 
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I would argue that this will also hold for the election of a new government, following the 
same logic as above. Even though a new majority government theoretically could agree on 
new policy immediately, that does not seem plausible. Policy, politics and reform take time so 
the election of a new government does not influence the here and now. It influences our 
expectations of what might happen in the future. On this basis, I would argue that the proxies 
are indeed exogenous to the investment level.   
The next step in deciding whether the proxies chosen are good enough is to discuss if they are 
relevant. The decision to invest depends on the expected return of investment. Expectations 
about the future is therefore relevant. As discussed in chapter 1.4, government heavily 
intervenes in the agricultural sector in Norway. If parties’ policies on agriculture did not 
differ, than the composition of parties and members of government would not matter. 
However, there are differences in policy4 and there are differences on how policy is perceived 
among farmers. Since government decide production terms, it is likely that the election of a 
new government or parliament can influence producer expectations. If farmers expect better 
production terms in the future, they will invest more and vice versa. It is therefore clear that 
elections, governments and expectations are closely linked. 
 
1.3 Politics and agriculture 
Risk may influence producer behaviour in many ways. Not all aspects of producer behaviour 
are readily available for analysis and one must identify an aspect of behaviour that will be 
influenced by risk, that is quantifiable and where data is available. For this purpose, I have 
chosen to look at farmers’ investment behaviour. The reason for this is that there is vast 
literature providing evidence that risk does in fact influence investment in general5. There are 
many data sources on investment and there is data allowing me to differentiate between 
different types of investment.  
In order to explain how investment and political risk is related, two points should be made. 1) 
If political risk is an important risk factor, farmers may, according to the real options theory 
                                                 
4 There are great variations on agricultural policy between parties and the Norwegian Farmers’ Association (Norsk Landbrukssamvirke) has 
a comprehensive review over stated policy on a variety of matters on their website. http://www.landbruk.no/Naeringspolitikk/Partienes-
politikk-2013-2017#.U1ZqZFegUW4 
5 For example the Capital Asset Pricing Model (French, 2003) and the Real Options Approach (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994) 
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discussed in section two, delay an investment decision in order to collect more information on 
the future political framework. 2) After an election, farmers will know how many seats a 
party has won in the election and they can formulate expectations based on stated policy 
programs and partisan strength. However, political risk will not be resolved until they know 
the outcome of the formal agricultural negotiations, described in section 1.4. The agricultural 
negotiations are normally held in the second quarter of a year. About half a year will therefore 
pass between the election date and the negotiations. If the hypothesis stated here is true, I 
would expect to see a decline in investment in the time before an election and up until the 
agricultural negotiations in the spring of next year.   
Before going further into the analysis, I will provide a graphical illustration depicting 
investment data, general elections and the election of new governments. This illustration 
should by no means be taken into account as evidence for the hypothesis. It merely portrays 
the effect I am looking to find and illustrates whether the hypothesis that political risk 
influences investment seems reasonable or not.  
Figure 1 shows gross investment in 2005 prices. The investment data displays great variations 
in investment over time, which is a good starting point for an analysis. If there were little 
variation, it would be difficult to analyse the effect of an exogenous shock. 
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Figure 1 Gross investment in agriculture and forestry from 1970-2013 (SSB) and dummy 
variables.  
For my purpose, some periods are of particular interest. For example, in the years of 1981, 
1989, 2005 and 2013, Norway held general elections and elected new governments. This is 
depicted by a hollow circle in the graph. Looking at the year 1981, we see that investment 
increases in the time before the election. During the election campaign, there is a slight drop 
in investment and the graph flattens. After the election, investment starts to decline. This 
could be considered to be “an option to wait effect” where farmers opted to wait and see the 
outcome of the election and the agricultural negotiations, before making an investment 
decision. In addition, if we look at the year 1989, we see that investment declines before the 
election. In the aftermath of the election, the graph flattens, before investment after a while 
starts to decline. Farmers optioning to “wait and see” to see the outcome of the agricultural 
negotiations described in section 1.4 could potentially explain this effect. 
Similar arguments could be made for the election of 2005 and before the election of 2013, so 
the hypothesis that political risk influences investment does seem plausible. There are some 
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breaks in trend investment that coincides with the election of new governments and general 
elections, but further analysis is needed before any conclusions can be drawn. 
 
1.4 Government controlled production and political 
risk.6 
The structure of Norwegian agricultural policy makes farmers heavily dependent on the 
political framework and political risk can theoretically be an important determinant in 
production. An important question in this context is if risk exposure is reduced by politically 
controlling production terms, or if it provides a false sense of certainty.  
The Basic Agricultural Agreement (Hovedavtalen i jordbruket) drawn up in 1950 forms the 
main legislation regulating the agricultural sector in Norway. Parties to the Basic Agreement 
are the two main farmers’ associations, The Norwegian Farmers’ Union (Norsk Bondelag) 
and the Norwegian Farmers' and Smallholders' Union (Norsk Bonde-og Småbrukarlag), 
which have the right to negotiate with the government in the annual agricultural negotiations. 
The negotiations start with the farmers publishing their official demands. The government 
then presents a first offer and these two documents establish the foundation for the 
agricultural negotiations. The government has superiority in the negotiations. Therefore, if 
negotiations break down, the government’s offer will be sent to Parliament were the 
governments offer will usually approved. Whether the negotiations end in breach or 
consensus, the final agreement is ratified in Parliament.  
The agriculture negotiations have seen a significant expansion over time in Norway. The 
number of measures in agricultural policy has been widened, which has also led to the 
agricultural sector having a greater opportunity to influence the content of this policy and 
making farmers more dependent on the political framework. 
The purpose of the Basic Agreement is to lay down target prices for domestically grown 
agricultural products, as well as to determine the level of fiscal support and direct payments 
distributed based on region, size of farms, number of animals and more.  
                                                 
6 Chapter 1.3. is based on the publication by  (Steen, 1988) and the article (Røynde & Gjerdåker).  
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2 Theoretical foundation 
2.1 Theories of investment under uncertainty 
The most common method to evaluate the profitability of investment projects is net present 
value analysis (NPV). This method implies that investment decisions be made by looking at 
future, expected cash-flows which are discounted to reflect underlying uncertainty7. For a 
given sunk cost of investment, standard present value analysis compares the discounted 
present value of expected profits, V, with the sunk cost of investing I. Thereby giving a 
trigger value of V=I.  
 
However, if investment decisions can be delayed, the neoclassic rule where investment should 
be undertaken if NPV>0, will no longer hold. Instead, the timing of the investment becomes a 
decision variable in itself. A farmer in a real world setting will frequently have a flexible 
investment decision. He can option to delay an investment decision: he can enter or exit a 
market; he can option to scrap old milking equipment, to delay the building of a new barn and 
more. This flexibility can affect a farmer’s revenue and excluding this flexibility will 
systematically underestimate the profitability of investment his projects. Trigeorgis (1998) 
therefore argues that the real options value should always be included when evaluating the 
profitability of an investment project. In accordance, the optimal trigger value for investment 
under uncertainty will no longer be V=I, as under NPV analysis, but by V=I + O because of 
the option value of waiting (assuming a positive option value O). (McDonald & Siegel, 1986), 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). 
 
To get an idea of the difference between NPV analysis and option theory we will look at an 
example. Assume that a risk neutral farmer has to decide whether to invest in more advanced 
milking equipment. If he invests, he will increase the value of the capital stock by K=100. 
This increase in the capital stock will be implemented instantly. Assume further that there is a 
constant depreciation rate of δ=10% and a sunk cost of investment given by I=650. In this 
                                                 
7 The direction of correlation between investment and risk not clear, and some authors argue that uncertainty can have the opposite 
effect, and actually lead to an increase investment. One example is given by (Slade, 2013) who in the article investment and uncertainty 
with time to build, showed that other factors such as long-term planning perspectives in building may in fact lead to an increase 
investment. Even though correlation is not clear, most literature on option theory predicts a reduction in investment when risk increases.  
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model there is uncertainty over which outcomes will be realized in the agricultural 
negotiations. This uncertainty will be resolved at t=1 and is binomially distributed with the 
subjective probability q=0, 5. A favourable outcome m=1 might be that a new government 
will allow larger milk quotas so that the farmer can earn higher profits. The favourable 
outcome will increase the value of his investment by 20%.  As for the unfavourable outcome 
m=2, this could be that a new government will reduce milk quotas which will decrease the 
value of investment by 20%.    
 
The formula for calculating the NPV is given by equation 2.18. 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝐼 −  𝐾 [∑
(1−𝛿)
(1+𝑟)𝑡
∞
𝑡=0 ] =  𝐾 [ 
1+𝑟
𝑟+𝛿
] − 𝐼                    2. 1 ) 
Assuming a risk-free interest rate of r = 5%, the net present value of investing immediately is.  
 
                      𝑁𝑃𝑉 =  100 [ 
1+0.05
0.05+0.1
] − 650 = 50    2. 2 ) 
 
As traditional NPV>0, the neoclassical investment theory dictates that the investment should 
be undertaken. However, this might be a mistake as the calculation above ignores the 
opportunity cost of waiting to see what the outcome of agricultural negotiations are. To 
highlight the effect we can calculate the NPV for m=1 where the value of the investment is 
increased by 20 % (equation (2.3)) and m=2 where the value of the investment decreases by 
20% (equation (2.4)). The net present value is discounted by one year as it entails the farmer 
waiting one year to invest to find out the outcome of the agricultural negotiations.  
 
                    𝑁𝑃𝑉 =
0.5
1.05
[ 100 × 1.2 [ 
1+0.05
0.05+0.1
] − 650] ≈ 90,5  > 50 2. 3 ) 
 
            𝑁𝑃𝑉 =
0.5
1.05
[100 × 0.8 [ 
1+0.05
0.05+0.1
] − 650] ≈ −43                      2. 4 ) 
 
We see that if the favourable outcome should come to pass, the farmer should invest because 
NPV>0. However, if the bad outcome comes to pass, the farmer should not want to invest 
                                                 
8 The framework for the NPV analysis is based on (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994) Chapter two. 
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because NPV<0. This is also an illustration of Bernake’s so called “bad news principle” 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994) which states that it is the ability to avoid the consequences of bad 
news that leads us to wait. Therefore, the option value will be contingent on good news. 
 
The example clearly shows that exercising the option to wait is better than investing right 
away. The opportunity cost of investing right away in this example will be given by the 
difference between the NVP in equations (2.2) and (2.3) which is 90.5 - 50 = 40.5. In other 
words, we would be willing to spend a pay-off of 40.5 in order to have a flexible investment 
opportunity. Since there is an opportunity cost of investing, the full cost of investment will be 
the investment cost plus the opportunity cost i.e. 650 + 40.5= 690. The additional 40.5 is the 
option value over the NPV value that represents the risk premium created by uncertainty.   
 
In order to quantify how valuable this flexibility is, we can calculate the level of sunk cost 
investment that will make the farmer indifferent between investing now and optioning to wait. 
In order to do this we will equate the expected NPV of waiting given by equation (2.3) and 
the NPV of investing immediately (2.2).  
 
                       𝑁𝑃𝑉 =
0.5
1.05
[ 100 × 1.2 [ 
1+0.05
0.05+0.1
] − 𝐼 ] = 50 2. 5 ) 
 
Solving this equation for I yields I=735 which represents a trigger value for which the value 
of sunk cost investment equals the value of waiting. That means that if the investment is 
lower than I = 735, the farmer should wait and vice versa. 
 
It should also be noted that the value of flexibility is not always be positive. Postponing an 
investment decision can for example have additional costs if the investor has competitors. 
Therefore, the investor must decide if the price of flexibility will surpass its value. The value 
of real options will therefore be the highest when there is uncertainty, when they have the 
option to exercise flexibility and the NPV value is near zero (Antikarov & Copeland, 2003).  
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2.2 Problem description 
This thesis will make use of the real option approach to investigate how political risk 
influences the agricultural sector. According to (Antikarov & Copeland, 2003) and Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994), there will be a real option to wait if the following characteristics of 
investment are present: (i) uncertainty about future payoffs; (ii) the ability to choose the 
optimal timing of investment; and (iii) investment decisions are at least partially irreversible. 
According to Dixit and Pindyck, an increase in risk will increase the real option value of 
investment, which will make firms more cautious. Firms will then prefer to wait and see, 
rather than to invest under uncertain circumstances (i.e. optioning to wait).9 I would argue that 
the characteristics put forth by Dixit and Pindyck is applicable for farmers’ investment 
decisions because (i) Parliament can influence farmers’ profits through target prices, transfers 
and more.10 (ii) In many cases, the option to delay investment will be feasible, at least for a 
little while. (iii) Many investment decisions in agriculture are firm specific and sunk cost. If a 
farmer builds a new barn, the investment cost cannot be recovered and is therefore sunk cost.  
 
Here the real option theory will be tested against data on investment in the agricultural sector. 
The purpose of this is to see if one can identify the “wait and see” effect predicted by option 
theory, during periods of increased political risk. Uncertainty in this paper is associated with 
fluctuations in political risk represented by general elections and the election of new 
governments. This uncertainty creates an opportunity cost of investing today, which is not 
included in the traditional net present value analysis (NPV). The opportunity cost arises 
because the timing of investment can affect farmers’ revenues. The farmer may be able to 
increase his revenue by postponing an investment decision during periods of increased 
political risk. It is this predicted delay in investment I will try to find evidence for.  
 
                                                 
9 Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics (2001) By Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen 
10 See section 1.4 for more on political governance in agriculture.  
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3 Data and method 
3.1 Data from Norwegian National Account  
The Norwegian National Accounts (Nasjonalregnskapet) offers quarterly data that allow us to 
analyse the effect of timing on investment. According to option theory, the option value will 
increase prior to an election and the quarterly data allow to study whether there is empirical 
evidence of this predicted drop in investment. 
The data used in this analysis, are quarterly time-series data from 1970-2013, downloaded 
from the SSB website table 09183 and is in current prices of mill. NOK. The data are 
calculated using the latest available final account year. This final account year is then used as 
a benchmark to calculate investment in the later periods11. Numbers are further developed 
with monthly economic indicator variables for volume and price development in investment 
provided by the Budget Committee for Agriculture (Budsjettnemnda for Jordbruk).  Thus, the 
quarterly numbers are based on a combination of information from the benchmark year and 
development in investment after the benchmark year.  
 
In order to find the effect of risk on investment, control variables for important determinants 
of investment are included. The control variables in this model are: aggregate demand given 
by Y and the interest rate, given by R.  
The business cycle significantly influences investment demand. The reason for this is that 
during periods of economic expansion, we will adjust our expectations of future disposable 
income and expect a higher disposable income in the future. With a higher disposable income, 
demand increases for both consumption goods and investment.  When disposable income 
increases, profit for businesses also increase, making it easier for businesses to finance new 
investments than when profits are low.  
In addition, during a recession there may also be greater uncertainty as no one knows when 
the recession will end. It is therefore assumed that private investment is heavily dependent on 
                                                 
11 For example if you use 2010 as a benchmark, then all four quarters in 2011 and 2012 will be benchmarked against 2010 numbers.  In 
addition, the preliminary numbers published for the first, second and third quarters in 2013 will be benchmarked against 2010 and it is only 
after the publication of 2011 numbers in November 2013, that 2011 numbers can be used as a benchmark. 
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aggregate demand and that demand varies with the business cycle. Aggregate demand has 
here been proxied by non-oil GDP downloaded from the SSB website (table 09190) and the 
data are in current prices of mill NOK for the years 1970-2013.  
 
The real interest rate is also an important determinant of investment. The reason for this is 
that it represents the alternative cost of capital. If, one decides to keep money in the bank 
instead of investing, that money will earn an interest. One who decides to invest therefore 
foregoes this increase in value represented by the real interest rate. The value of the 
alternative cost should therefore be included when deciding whether to invest or save money. 
This means that when interest rates are low, the alternative cost of investment is lower – 
giving a higher investment demand. Data on the real interest rate can be downloaded from 
SSB yearbook on (Statistics Norway)12. 
 
The dependent variable in this thesis is investment for farmers. The model controls for 
standard variables influencing investment, but I will also control for variables influencing 
investment in agriculture specifically. A change in the budgetary frame for the agricultural 
negotiations, given by BF13 in the equation, is such a variable. The budgetary frame will 
influence farmers’ incomes directly through prices and transfers and they can give incentives 
for increased investment.  
It is also expected that changes in the budgetary frame (i.e. transfers) and political risk are 
correlated. The reason for this is that political risk is a representation of farmers’ 
unobservable expectations. If farmers are experiencing increased risk, this can be because 
they fear that transfers may be reduced in the budgetary frame in the future. Many factors can 
influence the perception of risk, but the general election of 2013 might exemplify this in a 
good way. In 2013, the Progress Party (FRP) was elected into government together with the 
Conservative Party (Høyre). Both parties’ policies on agriculture are aimed at reducing 
agricultures dependency on state funding. It would therefore be rational for farmers to expect 
lower transfers in the future (i.e. increased risk). For the election of 2009 on the other hand, 
the Center Party (SP) was re-elected into government. The Center Party’s policies are aimed 
at securing food production throughout Norway, so it is less likely that they will reduce 
                                                 
12 http://www.ssb.no/a/aarbok/tab/tab-454.html 
13 For more information on the budgetary frame, see Appendix A.  
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transfers.14 By adding a variable that controls for changes in the budgetary frame, I will be 
able to separate the effect of risk, and the effect of transfers15 on investment. If we do not 
control for BF, the effect of government transfers will be included in the effect risk has on 
investment inflating the estimate.  
The regression also includes a set of seasonal dummies for the quarterly National Account. 
Production in agriculture is seasonally dependent and it is therefore likely that investment will 
be seasonal also.  
The basic econometric model to be estimated here is:  
Investment = α + Y +R +BF+ δ1Election+ δ2Government +q1+q2+q3+ ϵ            3. 1 ) 
Where α is the constant, Y is production, R is the interest rate, BF is the budgetary frame in 
the agricultural negotiations, q1-q3 are seasonal dummies and δ1Election and δ2Government 
are intercept dummies for political risk. A change in investment according to this model is 
therefore a result of a set of standard explanatory variables for investment and a set of dummy 
variables and a summary of the data is provided in table 1.  
Table1: Description of variables.
 
The variables δ1Election and δ2Government in the above equation are the main variables of 
interest. The variables are so-called intercept dummies that create a parallel shift in the 
equation when the dummy is equal to one. If the hypothesis in this thesis is true and political 
                                                 
14 Some would argue that the correlation between parties and transfers is not as clean cut as it is portrayed in this thesis. However, the 
main argument made here is that there is a correlation between political risk and government transfers.  
15 For more information on the data on producer support, please see Appendix 7.1.  
. 
Budgetaryf~e         143    840.5734    792.7356      -1650       1900
                                                                      
    Election         144       .0625    .2429064          0          1
  Government         144    .0763889    .2665464          0          1
Interestrate         140    5.594286    3.027732        -.4         12
  Production         144    250860.2    153251.6      49744     606495
  Investment         144    1424.215    430.1696        695       2617
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum Investment Production Interestrate Government Election Budgetaryframe
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risk does influence producer behaviour, I would expect a negative shift in investment when 
δ1Election=1.   
 
3.1.1 ARCH(1) model estimation. 
In order to estimate the effect of risk on investment I have chosen to use the autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH(1)) model and the following section is based on the 
framework of Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, the work of Sayed Hossain at the Hossain Academy 
(Hossain, u.d.) and Robert Engle’s article GARCH 101.  
 
The ARCH model will estimate the volatility (i.e. the standard deviation) of investment. If a 
farmer options to delay -  investment will decline before an election and this delay will 
increase the variance. After uncertainty is resolved, the farmer can choose to increase or 
reduce aggregate investment. This decision, to either increase or reduce investment, will also 
influence the variance. There may therefore also be valuable information on option values in 
the variance.  
 
The ARCH model is especially useful for modelling volatility and changes in volatility over 
time (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, Principles of econometrics , third edition, 2007). As risk can be 
measured as an increase in the standard deviation of investment (i.e. volatility), the ARCH 
model is a natural selection for our purpose.   
 
In order for the ARCH model to be applicable for our analysis two preconditions must be met:   
1. There must be clustering volatility in the residual 
2. There must be an ARCH effect in the residual 
 
1) Clustering volatility  
Clustering means that a period of high volatility is followed by another period of high 
volatility. While low volatility is followed by other periods of low volatility, for a prolonged 
period. If such an effect can be identified, we have clustering volatility. To illustrate the effect 
of variations in volatility I have plotted the residuals of the regression over time in Figure 2. 
We see that there are rapid changes in the residuals, so the data does exhibit volatility. In 
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addition, there is evidence of clustering volatility. If we look at the period 1961-1965 for 
example, there are periods of low volatility followed by low volatility. The period 1990-1995 
on the other hand, have periods of high volatility following high volatility. Therefore, the 
condition for clustering is met. 
 
Figure 2 Residuals from the fitted values of the regression over time.  
2) The second condition is that we must have an ARCH effect in the residual. To test for this 
we will use the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test in Stata. 
 
To perform the test we must first estimate equation 3.1 to obtain the estimated residuals Rt. 
The residuals Rt are conditional on the residual lagged Rt-1 (i.e. heteroscedasticity) and are a 
linear function of the residuals squared Rt-1
2 (Kennedy, 2008).  Stata has performed this test 
for us and the results are reported below.  
 
Table 2:  Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects 
 
-4
0
0
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0
0
0
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0
0
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0
0
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s
id
u
a
ls
1960q1 1965q1 1970q1 1975q1 1980q1 1985q1 1990q1 1995q1
Time
         H0: no ARCH effects      vs.  H1: ARCH(p) disturbance
                                                                           
       1               45.756               1                   0.0000
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH)
. estat archlm, lags(1)
16 
 
 
Our null hypothesis is that there are no ARCH effects and the alternative hypothesis is that 
there are ARCH effects. The Stata output gives us a p-value of 0.000, which is less than 
0.005. This implies that we can reject the null hypothesis for all significance levels and the 
ARCH model can be applied.  
 
The ARCH model consist of two equations, the mean equation and the variance equation. The 
mean equation is determined by economic theory and describes the behaviour of the variables 
form the mean in my time-series. The variance equation will describe investment today as a 
result of the mean value of investment today plus the standard deviation of investment (i.e. 
the square root of the variance) times the error for the present period.  
 
Mean equation: 
Investment = α1 + Y +R + q1+q2+q3 +ε       3. 2) 
 
Here we see investment as a function of a constant, production, the interest rate, seasonal 
dummies and the residual.  
 
Variance equation: 
V= α2 +  Rt-12 + BF+ δ1Election+ δ2Government +ε                              3. 3) 
 
Here V is the variance of the residual derived from mean equation (3.2) while Rt-1
2 is the 
previous periods squared residual known as the ARCH term. This term represents the internal 
shock that influences the volatility of investment. The variables BF, δ1Election, 
δ2Government represents external or predetermined shocks that influence the volatility of 
investment. The mean equation (3.2) and variance equation (3.3) are then estimated 
simultaneously using the maximum likelihood method and the output is reported in section 
4.1 
 
3.1.2 Alternative specification.  
The general model to be estimated here exhibits autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. One 
therefore has to decide if one wants to take advantage of this information in modelling or if 
17 
 
inference can be improved by applying other estimators. Instead of considering 
heteroscedasticity to be a problem that should be corrected, the ARCH model treats 
heteroscedasticity as a variance that should be modelled. In the previous section, the variance 
of investment was modelled because the Lagrange multiplier test indicated that we have an 
ARCH effect. However, the Lagrange multiplier test for ARCH can also be viewed as a 
misspecification test. Even though, the Lagrange multiplier test indicates that the presence of 
ARCH this could also be caused by the result of other misspecifications given by for example 
omitted variable bias. In order to verify the results from the ARCH model specification, I will 
try an alternative specification using ordinary least square regression (OLS). The least square 
regression does not model the variance of investment in the way that the ARCH model does. 
Instead, the least square regression estimates if the dummy variables for risk significantly 
influences the level of investment. While the results from ARCH and OLS are not directly 
comparable, estimating both the volatility of investment and the investment level will give us 
more information on the potential effect of risk on investment than if we just used one 
estimation method.  
The assumptions of the least square regression are discussed in Appendix A (section 6.1.1), 
but it should be noted that there is autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity so robust standard 
errors are applied.  
Investment = α + Y +Rt-1 +BF+ δ1Election+ δ2Government +q1+q2+q3+ ϵ        3.4)  
The basic econometric model to be estimated here is the same model as the one specified in 
section 3.1, but with a few minor changes. Firstly, I will include a lagged variable for the 
interest rate to account for the fact that it takes some time for the interest rate to influence the 
economy. This also had the model a better fit for the least square assumptions.  
Secondly, I have added a quarter to each of the dummy variables. The benefit of increasing 
the time-interval is that I am able to include more risk averse farmers in the regression. While 
some farmers will only option to delay an investment for one quarter, others will be more risk 
averse, optioning to wait for two quarters. Therefore, I will include more risk averse farmers 
in the regression by increasing the time-interval. However, there is also a down side. By 
increasing, the time interval where the dummy variable is equal to one, I will also increase the 
probability that there will be other factors than the election influencing the option value. 
Because when we look at a longer time interval it is likely that there will be other events that 
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potentially can influence the investment level. In spite of this, I have chosen to increase the 
time-interval so the hypothesis that risk influences investment will be tested on data for three 
months (i.e. quarter), six months in this specification.   
In summary, in the least square regression I will let the dummy variable represent the quarter 
before the election, and the quarter of the election. In addition, to account for the fact that 
there may be uncertainty for a longer period than one quarter when a new government is 
elected, I have included the quarter after a new government is elected. This uncertainty could 
be given by for example the option to wait until the agricultural negotiations. To illustrate the 
difference between the dummy variables in the ARCH model and the OLS regression I have 
included a figure that is reported below. 
 
 
Figure 3: Difference between dummy variables in the ARCH model and OLS specification. 
 
3.2 Aggregated Account for Agriculture. 
Option values might vary with the time-horizon and the depreciation rate.  For data on 
investment, I would expect to see a larger option value for investment decisions where the 
depreciation rate is larger and where the time-horizon for the investment decision is shorter 
(i.e. machines). The main variables of interest in this model are the dummy variables for risk 
given by general elections and the election of new governments. While a new government, 
theoretically, can be elected at any point in time, general elections are held every four years. If 
general elections represent an increase in political risk I would therefore expect to see a larger 
option value, on four year investment decisions, than on investments with a 15-20 year life 
span. To analyse if option values vary with time-horizon and the depreciation rate, I have 
chosen to look at data for the Aggregated Accounts for Agriculture (Totalkalkylen) table 
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310C (buildings) and 310D (machines)16 published by NILF in current prices NOK for the 
years 1959-2013. 17 
Two models will be estimated here: one for investment in machinery and one for investment 
in buildings. In section 3.1. I tested the hypothesis that that political risk influenced 
investment by applying an ARCH model and by ordinary least square regression. The 
Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects is not significant for the Aggregated Account for 
Agriculture, so in this section I will only apply the ordinary least squares regression. Meaning 
that in the analysis on the Aggregated Account I will not look at the volatility of investment. I 
will only look at how the investment level is influenced by an increase in political risk.  
The models here are variations of the model estimated in the previous section, but with some 
minor modifications. In order to improve the fit, a lagged interest rate has been included in 
both models. In addition, as these data are annual, seasonal dummies are no longer 
appropriate and have been excluded. In the investment model for buildings, there was a right 
skewed distribution and in order to improve the fit I squared the variable for production so 
that the OLS assumptions would. 
The data sources used in calculating investment in buildings and machinery differs, and a 
description of each individual dataset is included in the next section. Also, the model will 
apply the same control variables as in previous specifications. Data on GDP has been 
downloaded from the SSB website table 09842 and is in current prices NOK per capita. Data 
on the real interest rate, on the other hand, has been downloaded from the SSB yearbook18. 
For the investment in machinery model, I have also included a control variable for the value 
of Norwegian kroner (NOK). The reason for this is that Norway does not produce agricultural 
machinery and most equipment is imported. Therefore, if NOK appreciates against, for 
example American dollars, then farmers buying tractors in dollars will have to spend less 
NOK to get a tractor. It is therefore expected that the currency and import statistics are 
positively correlated and NOK is included in equation (3.6). The data for the exchange rate is 
available on the central bank webpage19and for the purpose of this thesis; I have chosen to 
                                                 
16 http://www.nilf.no/statistikk/totalkalkylen/2013_1/BMgrupper/Totalkalkylen-Bruttoinvest_Lopende_priser 
17 Information and data description in this section has been based on the publication for the Aggregated Account pages 105-110. 
(Budsjettnemnda for jordbruket, 2013) 
18 http://www.ssb.no/a/aarbok/tab/tab-454.html 
19 http://www.norges-bank.no/no/prisstabilitet/valutakurser/ 
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look at the I-44 index, which gives a yearly average of the value of NOK weighted against the 
yearly average of the currency in 44 other countries.  
 
3.2.1 Investment in buildings 
The data source for investment in buildings is based on the Sample Survey of Agriculture and 
Forestry. The surveys are conducted by Statistics Norway and were last performed in 2012. 
These data suffer from the same type of bias as the data in the National Accounts, as data are 
estimated. This is levied by the fact that data is further developed by information from the 
Farm Account described in section 3.3, but information on option values can still be lost in 
the aggregate. It should also be noted, that the data in the Aggregated Account are only based 
on investment in new buildings and repairs of buildings are not included.  
 
To test the hypothesis that political risk influences investment in buildings, ordinary least 
squares estimate has been performed on equation (3.5). The assumptions for the OLS 
regression are discussed in section 6.1.2, but it should be noted that the assumption of 
autocorrelation is violated. Robust standard errors are therefore applied and the results are 
reported in section 4.2. 
 
Invest buildings= α + Y^2 + Rt-1 + BF+ δ1Election+ δ2Government + ϵ                3. 5) 
 
3.2.2 Investment in machines 
The Aggregated Accounts for Agriculture offer data on investment in machinery and 
equipment. These data are mainly based on information on import of machinery, sale statistics 
from dealers and first time registration of motorized vehicles (Motorvognregisteret) 
(Budsjettnemnda for jordbruket, 2013). As data on investment in machinery are real, annual 
numbers instead of annual estimates it is reasonable to believe that option values will be 
better preserved and that data on machinery will be better suited for analysing short-term 
fluctuations in investment. To test the hypothesis that political risk influences investment a 
regression analysis has been performed on equation (3.6) and the results are reported in 
section 4.2.1: 
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Invest machinery = α + Y + Rt-1 + NOK +BF+ δ1Election+ δ2Government + ϵ      3.6)    
 
3.3 The Farm Account Data 
Data on the Farm Account (driftsgranskning) data, are panel data available for the years 1991-
2012 and have been supplied by Eva Øvren at NILF. The Farm Account data are annual 
surveys conducted by NILF. Surveys are quite thorough and they provide detailed 
information on Norwegian agriculture based on farmers’ tax accounts. These data do not 
suffer from the same bias as the data from the Aggregated Accounts or the National Accounts, 
which estimates investment on a variety of sources. The data from the Farm Account data are 
farmers’ tax accounts on how much they actually invested and what they invested in. Option 
values should therefore be well preserved in this data set.  
There are some issues in using these data in the regression20. Firstly, the sample is not 
random. Participants are chosen from a database of farmers applying for production subsidies 
from the Norwegian Agricultural Authorities (Statens Landbruksforvaltning), but not all 
farmers are allowed to participate. Only farmers of a certain size are invited to take part and 
the official criteria for the 2012 survey was that farmers had to have a gross margin of at least 
8 European Size Units (ESU), where one unit ESU=Euro 1200. In other words, farmers 
invited to participate had to have a gross margin of at least Euro 9600 or about NOK 75,000. 
In addition, surveys are quite comprehensive and time-consuming so not all farmers who are 
invited want to participate. These issues can bias the regression because it might be that 
farmers on larger farms respond to risk differently than farmers with small farms. There may 
also be differences between farmers that choose to participate in the surveys and those that do 
not. It should also be mentioned that the sample size for the data in this analysis was N=100 
in 2013, but the sample size is not constant. The rest of the econometric specification follows 
the same framework as in section 3.1- 3.2. 
 
                                                 
20 The information on the The Accounting Survey have been found in the 2012 publication of the The Accounting Survey (NILF, 2012).  
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3.3.1 Sector specific investment 
To analyse the effect of risk in one specific sector I have chosen to look at sheep farmers’ 
investment behaviour. This sector has been chosen because production terms have been 
relatively stable compared to other sectors. The general model to be estimated is given by 
(3.7) and the results are reported in section 4.3. The model has only been estimated using least 
square regression analysis as the Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effect is not significant. I 
am therefore not able to analyse the volatility of investment in this section. I am only able to 
analyse if political risk influences the investment level:  
 
Investment = α + Y+ Rt-1 + BF + δ1Election+ δ2Government + ϵ      3.7)         
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4 Results 
4.1 Results ARCH model  
 
The foundation for the ARCH model is centered on the variance of the model. By removing 
the trend from the variables of the mean equation, it analysis to what extent the variance of 
the model can be explained by the exogenous shocks of the model. The first part of the Stata 
output gives us the mean model. We see that all control variables are important determinants 
of investment at the 2% significance level, which indicates a strong correlation in the 
statistical sense. We see that investment is not heavily dependent on aggregate demand as 
predicted by economic theory. The coefficient for production is only ≈ 0.002. Though it does 
have a narrow confidence level, and low p-value. The coefficient for the interest rate on the 
other hand is much larger. This indicates that when the interest rate is increased by one, 
investment in agriculture will be reduced by approximately 18. Mill NOK. The seasonal 
dummies also profoundly influences investment. There can be several reasons for this. 
Investment in agriculture is heavily seasonally dependent because of the agricultural process, 
growing season and so on. However, the seasonal dummies can also have an alternative 
interpretation. In the second quarter of every year, Norway holds its agricultural negotiations 
and there will always be uncertainty related to the outcome of these. As the negotiations are 
held every year, it is not possible to control for the timing of these directly. On the other hand, 
the Stata output does display a reduction in investment in the first quarter (i.e. in the quarter 
before the negotiations) and an increase in investment after the negotiations (i.e. the second 
quarter). These results are in line with the hypothesis that a farmer will option to wait to find 
out more about the budgetary frame before investing.  
The second and third part of the Stata output, marked as HET and ARCH gives us the 
variance equation from equation (3.3). Here HET represents the standard deviation of 
investment (i.e. volatility). To find out if the variables are significant in explaining the 
volatility of investment we look at the p-value. The largest p-value here is for the variable that 
indicates the change in the budgetary frame. This p-value is 0.689, which is very high. 
Meaning that the variable is not significant at any significance level. This can also be seen by 
looking at the confidence interval, which is very wide. This is quite surprising, as one would 
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expect increases in the budgetary frame to increase investment. The lowest p-vale of the 
regression is 0.152, which is more than 0.10, meaning that the dummy variable for elections is 
not significant in explaining the volatility of investment at the 10% significance level. The 
coefficient for elections is negative, which is consistent with the hypothesis that investment 
falls when risk increases, but because the confidence interval is quite broad, we cannot be 
confident that elections and investment are negatively correlated. In summary, none of the 
variables for risk significantly influences the volatility of investment in a statistical sense. 
 
Lastly, we look at the ARCH effect. The ARCH effect has a p-value 0.039, which is less than 
0.05, meaning that the ARCH effect is significant in explaining the volatility of investment at 
the 0.05 significance level. This means that the previous periods residuals does influence 
volatility of investment today.  
 
Table 3: Results ARCH model estimation.
 
 
 
                                                                               
          L1.      .572167   .2746979     2.08   0.037     .0337689    1.110565
         arch  
ARCH           
                                                                               
        _cons     9.918891     .39476    25.13   0.000     9.145176    10.69261
Budgetaryfr~e    -.0001106   .0002767    -0.40   0.689     -.000653    .0004318
     Election    -5.604441   3.909705    -1.43   0.152    -13.26732    2.058439
   Government    -1.914528    1.48924    -1.29   0.199    -4.833384    1.004328
HET            
                                                                               
        _cons     1019.427    47.5995    21.42   0.000     926.1338     1112.72
     SesongQ3      366.115   27.89207    13.13   0.000     311.4475    420.7825
     SesongQ2     438.2942   29.33061    14.94   0.000     380.8073    495.7811
     SeasonQ1    -314.5556   34.44827    -9.13   0.000     -382.073   -247.0382
 Interestrate    -17.93673   3.573598    -5.02   0.000    -24.94086   -10.93261
   Production      .001664   .0000839    19.84   0.000     .0014996    .0018284
Investment     
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                OPG
                                                                               
Log likelihood = -901.1006                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(5)    =   1391.87
Sample: 1960q3 - 1995q1                            Number of obs   =       139
ARCH family regression -- multiplicative heteroskedasticity
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4.1.1 Alternative specification of ARCH 
The ARCH model specification did not yield significant results for the dummy variables for 
risk, but this could potentially be the result of the model specification. An alternative 
specification is therefore introduced and the results are presented in table 4.  
Table 4: Results OLS specification for the quarterly Norwegian National Account. 
 
The results from the ordinary least squares regression are quite different from the results 
obtained in the ARCH model estimation.  The p-value for the intercept dummy for 
governments is ≈ 0.18, which is more than 0.10, meaning that the election of a new 
government is insignificant in explaining investment at the 10% level. In addition, the sign of 
the coefficient has changed. Since the confidence level is broad too much emphasis cannot be 
put on this, but it does indicate that the sign of the coefficient is unstable across specifications. 
The dummy variable for elections in the ARCH model had a p-value of 0.152. In the least 
squares regression, the p-value is 0.854, which is much higher. Meaning that elections are not 
significant in explaining either the volatility of investment or the investment level. The results 
from the least squares regression is quite different than the results from the ARCH model 
                                                                              
       _cons     962.6709   60.72644    15.85   0.000     842.5396    1082.802
    Election     9.482937   51.47222     0.18   0.854    -92.34139    111.3073
  Government     50.22227   37.21352     1.35   0.179    -23.39495    123.8395
          BF     .0378662   .0221868     1.71   0.090    -.0060246    .0817569
    SesongQ3     356.1245   49.84606     7.14   0.000     257.5171    454.7319
    SesongQ1    -326.4212   39.24611    -8.32   0.000    -404.0594    -248.783
    SesongQ2     425.7019   50.63781     8.41   0.000     325.5282    525.8756
              
         L1.    -15.48202   4.449941    -3.48   0.001    -24.28506   -6.678973
Interestrate  
              
  Production     .0015867   .0001243    12.76   0.000     .0013407    .0018326
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Robust HC3
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  189.66
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8116
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,   131) =   67.36
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     140
> ernment Election, vce(hc3)
. regress Investment Production L.Interestrate SesongQ2 SesongQ1 SesongQ3 BF Gov
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specification, still both specifications rejects the hypothesis that risk significantly influences 
investment.  
 
4.2 Results Aggregated Account buildings. 
Table 5: Result from OLS regression on data on annual investment in buildings. 
 
To interpret the results of the regression I will look at the p-value and confidence interval for 
the regressors. The results indicate that both production and the budgetary frame are 
significant in explaining investment. Production has a p-value of 0.000, while the budgetary 
frame has a p-value of 0.003, which is less than 0.005. Meaning that both production and the 
budgetary frame are significant in explaining investment at the 5% level.  
The weakest test statistics of the regression is obtained for the dummy on elections. The 
election dummy has a p-value of 0.898, which is considerably higher than 0.005, meaning that 
we can thoroughly refuse the hypothesis that the elections influence investment in buildings at 
the 5% significance level and all other reasonable significance levels.  
The results also indicate that the sign of the coefficient for the elections variable is unstable.  
In the ARCH model we saw that the results gave non-significant results with negative 
                                                                               
        _cons     982839.3     237029     4.15   0.000     497307.4     1468371
       DummyE     22844.19     177093     0.13   0.898    -339914.4    385602.7
       DummyG    -103112.6   169710.1    -0.61   0.548      -450748    244522.8
Budgetaryfr~e     242.3199   73.37378     3.30   0.003     92.02053    392.6193
               
          L1.     23410.78   25948.09     0.90   0.375    -29741.48    76563.04
     Interest  
               
        Prod2     5.39e-06   6.29e-07     8.57   0.000     4.10e-06    6.68e-06
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                                       Root MSE      =  3.4e+05
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7678
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,    28) =   23.10
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      34
. regress Investment Prod2 L.Interest Budgetaryframe DummyG DummyE, robust
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coefficients, while the least squares estimates have given a non-significant positive 
coefficient. However, the maximum likelihood estimation from the ARCH model was 
performed on quarterly data and the least squares estimates are performed on annual data. The 
positive coefficient for elections can therefore be picking up an increase in investment in the 
time after the election. Still, the p-value for elections is quite high and the confidence interval 
quite broad, so too much emphasis should not be put on this result. 
The second weakest test statistic of the regression is obtained for the dummy variable new 
governments, which has a p-value of 0.548. That is considerably higher than 0.005, meaning 
the new governments does not influence investment in new buildings in the statistical sense.  
4.2.1 Results Aggregated Account machines. 
Table 6: Result from OLS regression on data on annual investment in machines 
 
The results obtained in the second specification for the Aggregated Account, indicate that the 
variable for production is significant in explaining investment in agricultural machinery at the 
10% significance level and NOK is significant in explaining investment at a 15% significance 
level.  
. 
                                                                               
        _cons     -1918274    1476688    -1.30   0.205     -4948187     1111639
       DummyE      -189312   142543.1    -1.33   0.195    -481786.3    103162.2
       DummyG     191365.5     145314     1.32   0.199    -106794.1    489525.1
Budgetaryfr~e     73.58518   82.63345     0.89   0.381    -95.96465     243.135
          NOK     44295.33   16474.53     2.69   0.012     10492.39    78098.26
               
          L1.    -58157.62   32091.48    -1.81   0.081    -124003.9    7688.659
     interest  
               
   Production     1.047222   .3709961     2.82   0.009     .2860013    1.808444
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    4.4232e+12    33  1.3404e+11           Root MSE      =  3.0e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3063
    Residual    2.5106e+12    27  9.2984e+10           R-squared     =  0.4324
       Model    1.9126e+12     6  3.1877e+11           Prob > F      =  0.0120
                                                       F(  6,    27) =    3.43
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      34
. reg Investment Production L.interest NOK Budgetaryframe DummyG DummyE
28 
 
A surprising result is obtained for the variable for changes in the budgetary frame. The 
budgetary frame was significant at a 5% significance level for investment in buildings, but it 
is not significant for any reasonable significance level for investment in machines with a p-
value of 0.381. This means that farmers do not go out and buy a new tractor if the budgetary 
frame increases. They may however, decide to build a new barn if they believe that 
production terms will be improved.  
In section 3.2 of this paper, I theorized that option values might vary with the depreciation 
rate and the time-horizon of investment. The results of the regression indicate that this could 
be true. Though both dummy variables for risk are insignificant, we do see a considerable 
difference in the test statistic between investment in machines and in buildings on our dummy 
variables. While the p-value for general elections on investment in buildings is 0.898 - the p-
value for machines is 0.195, which is considerably lower.  
This result also holds for the dummy variable for a new government. Here the p-value for the 
dummy variable on new governments was 0.548 for investment in buildings, and 0.199 for 
investment in machines. Though all the coefficients on the variables for risk are insignificant 
there does seem to be an effect of the depreciation rate on the option values for investment. 
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4.3 Results Farm Account data 
Table 7: Result from OLS regression on data for sheep farmers’ annual investment.
 
The dependent variable in this regression is sheep farmers’ investment. The results of this 
regression indicate that production among sheep farmers is dependent on aggregate demand 
proxied by GDP in the regression. The lagged version of the real interest rate on the other 
hand is not significant.  
 
The lowest p-value for our dummies on political risk is given by the variable for new 
governments. This dummy has a p-value of 0.006, which is less than 0.010. Meaning that new 
governments are significant in explaining investment among sheep farmers at a 10% 
significance level. This means that in the year were a new government is elected, aggregate 
investment among sheep farmers is reduced with 2 197 588 NOK. This could be interpreted 
as farmers optioning to wait before investing to get more information on the political 
framework. While this is not strongly significant, it does indicate that there might be a small 
effect of political risk on producer behaviour when new governments are elected. 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
       _cons     -4284549    2615502    -1.64   0.122     -9859359     1290261
      DummyE      1156899   982756.4     1.18   0.257    -937796.2     3251595
      DummyG     -2197588    1109018    -1.98   0.066     -4561404    166227.4
          BF     959.9834   825.5472     1.16   0.263    -799.6287    2719.596
              
         L1.       134009   261971.1     0.51   0.616    -424369.1    692387.2
    interest  
              
  Production     25.14184    4.37112     5.75   0.000     15.82502    34.45866
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.2331e+14    20  1.6165e+13           Root MSE      =  1.6e+06
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8416
    Residual    3.8402e+13    15  2.5601e+12           R-squared     =  0.8812
       Model    2.8491e+14     5  5.6981e+13           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,    15) =   22.26
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      21
. regress Investment Production L.interest BF DummyG DummyE
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Discussion of regression results 
In summary, I have found little evidence for an effect of political risk on investment data and 
no evidence that political risk significantly influences producer behaviour.  
There may be three reasons for this. 
1) The data sources may not be accurate enough to identify an option to wait value. 
2) The proxy variables for political risk may be inapplicable.  
3) Political risk may not be an important risk factor.  
 
1) One could argue that data sources in this thesis are highly processed and therefore 
unsuitable for analysing the effect of political risk on investment. If the data sources are 
inappropriate, evidence of option values may have been lost in the aggregate. When I first 
started working on this thesis I believed that the quarterly numbers from the National Account 
would be best suited to analyse short term variations in risk because they offered data for 
every quarter. However, as previously explained, these data are based on economic indicator 
values. Thus, there is a possibility that the reason we do not find evidence of political risk on 
investment data, is that the information may have been lost during processing. 
The data for investment in machines form the Aggregated Accounts should be more precise as 
they are based on import statistics, sale from dealers and first time registration of vehicles. In 
these data, we do see a small effect on the dummy variables for risk, but the result is not 
significant. If data problems are the reason that we do not find a significant effect of risk on 
investment - then the data on investment in machinery and the account data from sheep 
farmers should be most reliable. Given that this is true, it is natural to compare the results 
from these two regressions.  
In the regression on investment data from sheep farmers, we saw that the dummy variable for 
new governments was significant at a 10% significance level with a negative correlation. This 
is in contrast to the results obtained in the regression analysis on investment in machines, 
where we saw a positive correlation. It should be noted that the p- value on this dummy was 
0.199, and the confidence interval indicates that the sign of the coefficient could be either 
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positive or negative, but it is important to note that there is a discrepancy between the results 
of the most reliable data sources on the effect of risk on investment.  
The Farm Account could potentially be best suited to analyse the effect of political risk on 
investment data, because the data are not processed. The data are based on sheep farmers’ tax 
reports and should therefore be a reliable source of actual investment. Researchers should 
however be careful not to only use data confirming one's hypothesis. All relevant sources of 
information should be taken into account when discussing a research topic. 
2) The proxy variables for risk in this thesis may be inapplicable and there may be other 
variables that will be a better measure of risk. The data offers no evidence of elections 
influencing investment and weak significance of the election of new governments in section 
4.3.1. One conclusion that could be drawn from this is that, elections are unsuitable for 
analysing the effect of risk on investment. If parliamentary elections is a bad measure of risk, 
one could ask the question if there is reason to believe that the election of new governments 
will be a better measure? I would argue that this could be the case, but I do not believe that 
this is the problem. An election in itself will not change the political framework, but a new 
government can. On the other hand, many governments in Norway are minority governments, 
so government will often have to seek support in parliament in order to achieve majority for 
their policy. Parliamentary strength is given by general elections and I therefore believe that 
both instruments should be relevant.   
Another potential explanation for general elections not significantly influencing investment is 
that one election can be very different from another. In the 2009 election there was no united 
opposition against the incumbent Red-Green government. In the election of 2013, on the other 
hand, the opposition was more united and elections polls suggested that a new government 
would be elected. There could potentially be a difference in how farmers’ perceived political 
risk in these two elections. If for example farmers’ perceived political risk to be smaller under 
the 2009 general election, than under the 2013 election, than these dummy variables may not 
be appropriate measures of risk.  
3) The third interpretation of results is that political risk is not an important risk factor in 
Norwegian agriculture. Risk does not significantly vary and is uncorrelated with partisan 
strength and parties in government. Long-term production conditions in agriculture vary 
slowly and are not heavily dependent on parties’ strength in Parliament. In Norway, we have 
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several arrangements that are aimed at giving farmers predictable production terms and these 
results may indicate that these arrangements are quite effective. The agricultural sector is 
stable and thoroughly regulated and systems set in place give farmers predictable production 
terms.  
I would argue that there are three arguments that support the conclusion that political risk is 
not an important risk factor in investment.  
- The Norwegian referendums on membership in the European Union should represent 
two distinct time-periods of significant political risk. In the event of a EU 
membership, Norway would no longer be able to protect agriculture by tariff barriers 
and restrictions on producer support would be set in place. Given that political risk is a 
significant risk factor, investment should therefore decline in the time before the 
referendums. However, this was not the case and if we look at fig. 1 on page 5, we see 
that investment increased both before the referendum in 1972 and before the 
referendum in 1994. This suggests that the reason we do not find a significant effect of 
political risk is not that the proxy variables for risk are inappropriate, but that political 
risk is actually not an important determinant for investment. 
- In this thesis, there are five models with two proxy variables for risk in each 
specification. While I do find that the election of new governments are weakly 
significant on a 10 % significance level, I would argue that we cannot attribute too 
much importance to this result. 
For21 a 10 % significance level there is a 90 % probability that a variable is 
insignificant. If we assume that the probabilities of significance are independent, there 
will be a 0,9^2=81% probability for none of the variables being significant at the 10% 
significance level in each specification. With five specifications and two proxies, we 
will test the hypothesis ten times. Here the probability of finding a significant proxy 
will be 0,9^10=35%. In other words, the probability that we will find one proxy to be 
significant, in one of the specifications, is higher than the probability that we will find 
none of the proxies to be significant. The probability that we will find significant 
results will therefore increase, also for specifications where there is no correlation 
                                                 
21 The following section is based on a line of argument drawn up by supervisor Kjell Arne Brekke.   
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between variables. One weakly significant result for one proxy is therefore not a 
strong argument for the election of new governments influencing investment.  
- In recent years, there has been much debate on how the election of the Progress Party 
would affect agricultural production and in the election of 2013 the newspapers22 
predicted that right wing politics could destroy Norwegian agriculture. How the 
election of the Progress Party will influence investment will therefore be important. 
While data on the full effect of this election are not yet available, we do have some 
information. If we look at data from the Aggregated Accounts on investment in 
machinery we see that average annual investment during the Red-Green government 
from 2005 to October 2013 was 2 455 955. While total investment in 2013 was 2 474 
200. In other words, the data show a slight increase in investment. While one could 
argue that the Progress Party was not elected into government before October 2013, 
voters knew throughout the election year of 2013 that the Progress Party could be 
elected. Therefore, if farmers associated the election of the Progress Party with a 
significant increase in risk, it would not be rational for them to increase investment. 
As these numbers are preliminary, we cannot attribute to much importance to this 
result. However, I do think that it is important to note several arguments point in the 
direction that political risk is insignificant.  
 
5.2 Discussion of model specification 
According to the Keynesian tradition, investment can be explained by variations in income 
and the interest rate. The main purpose of this, is to analyse if some part of the variation in 
investment can be explained by variations risk. The total variation (SST) explained by the 
model is therefore relevant. Total variation can be divided into two parts. One that is 
explained by the model, given SSR, and one part that is caused by random deviations SSE. To 
find out how much of the variation is explained here we will look at R2 which is given by 
R2=SST/SSR.  
                                                 
22 http://www.nrk.no/sorlandet/mener-bla-politikk-vil-rasere-bygda-1.10874723 
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By comparing the R2, we see that the R2 is largest in the analysis for the Farm Account data. 
Here the R2 is 0.88, while in comparison it is 0.768 for the model on investment in buildings 
and 0.4324 for the model of investment in machines. The R2 from the Farm Account data 
could be an indication that the specification where political risk was significant was a better 
fit. However, the R2 for investment in buildings is also quite high and in this analysis the 
dummy variable for new governments was not significant and with a p-value of 0.548.  It is 
therefore difficult to draw any definitive conclusion. Based on these criteria, I would argue 
that the best fits are for the model in section 3.2.1 (investment in buildings) and section 3.3 
(Farm Account data).  
We also see that there is a difference in significance for our proxy variables with regard to the 
depreciation rate and when looking the Farm Account data. One interpretation of this is that 
farmers do experience some risk, but that it does not significantly influence their producer 
behaviour. 
The aim of this thesis was to analyse the effect of political risk on producer behaviour. The 
regression models do not provide significant support for the hypothesis from a statistical point 
of view. However, this does not mean that political risk does not play a role for farmers’ 
behaviour. For instance, an extension on this subject could be to analyse if there is correlation 
between the number of farms closing down production and variables for political risk. One 
possible solution here could be to analyse the correlation between entry and exit options for 
data on number of farms that are operational and risk.  
 
5.2.1 Misspecification of the model  
A potentially major weakness of this study may be that the model is misspecified in some 
way. The relationships between risk and investment may be logarithmic or results may suffer 
from omitted variable problems. To achieve the highest robustness of results, I have used 
different techniques to estimate the effect of risk on investment. Among them is OLS with and 
without robust standard errors and maximum likelihood estimation in the ARCH model.     
 
Yet, this may only partially alleviate the risk of misspecification if the proxy variables chosen 
are invalid or if information of risk is lost in the process. It might also be that I have not been 
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fully able to isolate the full effect of political risk. To check if the model is correctly specified 
I will apply the Ramsey’s Reset test in Stata. The null hypothesis in the Ramsey Reset test is 
that the model is correctly specified while the alternative hypothesis is that the model is 
misspecified. The Ramsey test for omitted variable reveals that the only model that does not 
potentially suffer from omitted variable bias is the model for investment in buildings. The 
Ramsey test in table 9 reveals a p-value of 0.3578, which is more than 0.10, indicating that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified. If the model for 
investment in buildings is indeed the best fit, the results of this regression does not indicate a 
significant influence of political risk.  
 
Of particular interest is the model specification for investment among sheep farmers in the 
Farm Account data and this model may suffer from omitted variable bias with a p-value of 
0.071. This will mean that we cannot put too much weight on the significance result for 
election on new governments, because the model may be misspecified.     
 
This might also be a result of the estimation method used. Since I do not have endogenous 
variation in the right hand variable I have not used instrumental variable (IV) estimation. 
Instead, I have used a standard proxy variable and ordinary least squares and the IV and OLS 
methods handle the error term differently. While the instrumental variable approach leaves the 
unobserved variable in the error term, a proxy variable tries to remove the unobserved 
variable (i.e. risk) from the error term. In this way, the instrumental variable recognizes the 
presence of omitted variable and uses an estimation that will account for this. (Schuetze) As 
the least squares estimation does not recognizes the presence of a possible omitted variable 
problem, the Ramsey Reset test might be picking up on the presence of a possible omitted 
variable in the error term, and this could potentially have been resolved by using the 
instrumental variable approach.  
 
Table 8: Ramsey test section 3.1.2 (Norwegian National Account) 
 
                  Prob > F =      0.0002
                 F(3, 128) =      7.11
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of Investment
. estat ovtest
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Table 9: Ramsey test section 3.2.1. (Buildings)
  
 
Table 10: Ramsey test section 3.2.2. (Machines)
 
 
Table 11: Ramsey test section 3.3.1. (Sheep farmers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Prob > F =      0.3578
                  F(3, 24) =      1.13
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of Investment
. estat ovtest
                  Prob > F =      0.0298
                  F(3, 25) =      3.51
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of Investment
. estat ovtest
                  Prob > F =      0.0710
                  F(3, 12) =      3.03
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of Investment
. estat ovtest
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6 Conclusion  
The purpose of this thesis has been to address political risk in agriculture and to what extent 
investment decisions in agriculture are influenced by political risk. Real option theory 
suggests that political risk incurs a positive option value to wait. In line with the theory, a 
hypothesis has been established, according to which investments in the agricultural sector are 
lower in periods prior to elections or when a new government is elected. The hypothesis has 
been tested empirically on four different datasets and with two different econometric 
specifications. The ARCH model test the hypothesis that political risk influences the volatility 
of investment in the Norwegian National Account and I find no evidence that it does. The 
least square regression estimates if political risk influences the investment level. While I do 
find that the dummy variable for new governments is weakly significant in one of the 
specifications, I argue that the evidence is unconvincing.  
Even if the results do not support the hypothesis, it cannot be rejected either. While I do 
discuss potential problems such as missing variables, misspecification of the model or poor 
variables, which may lead me to falsely reject the hypothesis in section five. I find no 
conclusive evidence for political risk influencing neither the volatility of investment nor the 
investment level. 
In the introduction, I argued that there was a theoretical possibility that political risk had 
replaced market risk in agriculture- that the level of risk experienced by farmers was the 
same, but that the source of risk was different. The analysis in this thesis indicates that 
political risk does not significantly influence producer behaviour in the agricultural sector – at 
least with the readily available data and less sophisticated models applied in the analysis. I 
take this as an indication that it is not obvious that political risk has an effect on investment 
decisions in the agricultural sector. If there was an obvious correlation, the analysis would 
have revealed some support in favor of the hypothesis.  
Nevertheless, it might still be the case that better data and more advanced models would be 
able to identify some significant relationship between the degree of political risk and 
investment decisions in agriculture. Hence, more research is required to better understand 
these questions.   
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Appendix A: Data on producer support  
In this thesis, there are two sources of information on how much economic support a farmer 
receives. The first data set gives information on how much the budgetary frame for the 
agricultural negotiations (rammen for budsjettoppgjøret) changes from year to year. These 
numbers do not therefore give information on absolute producer support received by farmers; 
it only gives information on how much the budget changes. Data on the budgetary frame is 
available for the years 1980-2013.  
A more accurate representation of the economic agricultural support is given in the OECD 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) calculations. The PSE numbers also account for market 
price support and tax reductions received by farmers, which is not included in the data for the 
budgetary frame.  The Producer Support Estimates are therefore better suited to give 
information on real world producer support. On the other hand, the PSE numbers are only 
available from 1996-2012, so it offers a shorter time-series.  
To decide on which of the producer support variables should be included, I have looked at the 
correlation between investment and the two different variables for producer support. The 
results indicated a correlation between investment and change in the budgetary frame of 
0,2047 and a correlation between investment and PSE of 0,2003. The data on the budgetary 
frame is therefore more closely correlated with investment and have consequently been 
chosen as the variable to be included in the model. The data on the budgetary frame was also 
statistically more significant than the PSE numbers offering further support for the choice of 
variable. My supervisor Klaus Mittenzwei at NILF has provided both the data on the 
budgetary framework and PSE calculations.   
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Appendix B: OLS assumptions 
6.1.1 OLS assumptions Norwegian National Account 
For estimation by OLS to yield unbiased estimates and inference, the following assumptions 
must be fulfilled. (Wooldridge, 2009). 
A1) There should be a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables.   
(A2) Random sampling, i.e. the data sample. 
(A3) There are no perfect linear relationships between the explanatory variables. 
(A4) The expected value of the residual is zero, conditional upon all the explanatory variables 
(A5) The residual displays constant conditional variance.  
(A6) There should not be autocorrelation in the residuals. 
 
Assumption (A1) - (A2) for more information on this I refer to 3.1 on the data sources. In 
order to analyse (A3) I have performed a sample estimation of the correlations between the 
independent variables. The numbers reported in the matrix are Pearson correlation coefficient. 
These coefficients measures the linear dependence between variables by giving it a numerical 
value between +1 and -1. A coefficient close to 1, indicates a strong positive correlation. 
While a negative value indicates a negative correlation. Table 11 does not display any perfect 
linear relationship between explanatory variables.  
 
Table 12: correlation matrix of right hand side variables for the National Account data 
 
 
    Election     0.0462  -0.0946   0.2182  -0.2182   0.2182   0.0180  -0.0967 
  Government    -0.0805  -0.0479  -0.1022   0.1704  -0.1931   0.1040   1.0000 
          BF    -0.0909  -0.0848   0.0022  -0.0066   0.0022   1.0000 
    SesongQ3    -0.0074   0.0000  -0.3333  -0.3333   1.0000 
    SesongQ1    -0.0276   0.0000  -0.3333   1.0000 
    SesongQ2    -0.0192   0.0000   1.0000 
L.Interest~e    -0.3359   1.0000 
  Production     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Produc~n L.Inte~e SesongQ2 SesongQ1 SesongQ3       BF Govern~t
> tion
. pwcorr Production L.Interestrate SesongQ2 SesongQ1 SesongQ3 BF Government Elec
40 
 
Assumption (A4) states that the expected value of the residual should be zero conditional on 
all the explanatory variables. In order to check this I have calculated the mean of the residuals 
for the fitted values in the data. The calculations give a mean of approximately zero and the 
assumption is met.  
 
Table 13: Expected value of National Account data 
 
 
To test the variance of residuals (A5) I have chosen to perform a post-regression analysis of 
the residuals squared, called the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity. This test is 
designed to test the null hypothesis that we have constant variance (i.e. homoscedasticity) 
against the alternative hypothesis that we have heteroscedasticity. To reject the null 
hypothesis at a significance level of for example 0.05 we need a p-value below that value. The 
results are reported in the table below and reveal a p-value 0.0002 indicating that we do have 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
Table 14: Heteroscedasticity test for National Account data 
 
 
To test for auto-correlation I have applied the alternative Durbin’s test and Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange Multiplier test. The test does reveal that we have autocorrelation between 
investment and production as well as between investment and the interest rate, so robust 
standard errors must be applied.  
                                                              
           e    -9.12e-08   15.56085     -30.76656    30.76656
                                                              
                     Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                              
Mean estimation                     Number of obs    =     140
. mean e
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0002
         chi2(1)      =    13.45
         Variables: fitted values of Investment
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
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Table 15: Autocorrelation test for National Account data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1               80.083               1                   0.0000
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. estat bgodfrey
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1              173.754               1                   0.0000
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Durbin's alternative test for autocorrelation
. durbina
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6.1.2 OLS estimation the Aggregated Account 
Assumption (A1) - (A2) for more information on this I refer to 3.2 on the data sources. In 
order to analyse (A3) I have estimated the Pearson correlation coefficient. Several authors 
have tried to set guidelines for the interpretation for the coefficient, but there is not agreement 
on which level of correlation that will bias the interpretation of the model, but estimates vary 
between 0.7 and 0.9. (Wikipedia). If there is a multicollinearity problem in these data it will 
be between the interest rate and the Norwegian krone in Table 17. This result is in line with 
economic theory, so a strong correlation is natural. Dropping one of the variables would 
eliminate the problem of multicollinearity, but it would also result in a significantly lower R 
squared. I would argue that both the interest rate and the value of the Norwegian krone are 
essential to the analysis and make a significant contribution to the overall model. Both the 
interest rate and the value of the NOK can be important determinants of investment in 
imported machines so I believe that excluding them would reduce the overall quality of the 
model. To look further into this I have performed a regression analysis on investment in 
machines, excluding the NOK. The analysis revealed that the greatest impact of the change of 
specification was on the significance of changes in the budgetary frame and the interest rate. 
While this is important on the interpretation for these coefficients, it does not influence the 
interpretation of the dummy variables for risk. I will therefore disregard the problem of weak 
collinearity between the interest rate and NOK.  
 
Table 16: Correlation matrix right hand side variables investment in buildings.
 
. 
      DummyE     0.0646  -0.0820   0.0308   0.3609   1.0000 
      DummyG    -0.1062  -0.0497   0.1520   1.0000 
Budsjettra~r    -0.0027  -0.2237   1.0000 
   Realrente     0.1224   1.0000 
  Produksjon     1.0000 
                                                           
               Produk~n Realre~e Budsje~r   DummyG   DummyE
. pwcorr Produksjon Realrente Budsjettrammejordbruksoppgjr DummyG DummyE
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Table 17: Correlation matrix right hand side variables investment in machines
 
 
Assumption (A4). The mean of the residual is our best guess for the expected value and the 
calculations give a mean of -0.0015 for machines and a mean of 0.002 for buildings, which is 
fairly close to zero. I have also looked at the distribution of the residuals, which are both 
somewhat rightly skewed, however the deviation is not large and residuals are approximately 
normally distributed. The distribution of the errors of investment in machines is listed first 
and errors in buildings is second.  
 
Figure 4: Residuals of fitted regression investment machines 
 
 
 
      DummyE     0.0646  -0.0640   0.0037   0.0308   0.3609   1.0000 
      DummyG    -0.1062  -0.0323   0.0689   0.1520   1.0000 
Budsjettra~r    -0.0027  -0.2237  -0.4890   1.0000 
         NOK     0.0627   0.7547   1.0000 
    interest     0.1663   1.0000 
  Produksjon     1.0000 
                                                                    
               Produk~n interest      NOK Budsje~r   DummyG   DummyE
. pwcorr Produksjon interest NOK Budsjettrammejordbruksoppgjr DummyG DummyE
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Figure 5: Residuals of fitted regression investment machines  
 
Table 18: Expected value of residuals (proxied by mean) Machines.
 
 
Table 19: Expected value of residuals (proxied by mean) Buildings 
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           e    -.0014505   47303.19     -96239.07    96239.07
                                                              
                     Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                              
Mean estimation                     Number of obs    =      34
. mean e
                                                              
         res     .0019531   53478.27     -108802.4    108802.4
                                                              
                     Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                              
Mean estimation                     Number of obs    =      34
. mean res
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To test the variance of residuals (A5) I have performed a Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroscedasticity. The results are reported in the table below and reveal a p-value of 0.8641 
for machines and a p-value of 0.7238 for buildings. We can therefore not reject the null 
hypothesis for any reasonable significance levels and the Breusch-Pagan test for the fitted 
values of the regression does not display any significant heteroscedasticity.  
Table 20: Heteroscedasticity test Machines 
 
Table 21: Heteroscedasticity test buildings
 
 
To test for auto-correlation I have applied the alternative Durbin’s test and Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation. For investment in buildings, we do have 
autocorrelation between investment and the interest rate. As well as between investment and 
production. In order to improve the fit I included a lagged version of the interest rate. This can 
cause identification problems if the interest rate and the lagged interest rate, are too closely 
correlated. The correlation is 0.7 so the correlation is strong, but there is no perfect 
collinearity so it should be okay. This modification did not remove the problem of 
autocorrelation so robust standard errors must be applied.  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.8641
         chi2(1)      =     0.03
         Variables: fitted values of Investment
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.7238
         chi2(5)      =     2.85
                    DummyE
         Variables: Produksjon2 L.Realrente Budsjettrammejordbruksoppgjr DummyG
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table 22: Autocorrelation test Machines
 
Table 23: Autocorrelation test Buildings
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1                2.347               1                   0.1256
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. estat bgodfrey
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1                1.927               1                   0.1650
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Durbin's alternative test for autocorrelation
. durbina
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1                9.218               1                   0.0024
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. estat bgodfrey
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1               10.043               1                   0.0015
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Durbin's alternative test for autocorrelation
. durbina
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6.1.3 OLS assumptions Farm Account data.  
Assumption (A1) - (A2) I refer to the discussion in section 3.3. In order to analyse (A3) I have 
performed a sample estimation of the correlations between the independent variables and the 
results are reported below. There seem to be no problems of linear correlation between right 
hand variables.  
Table 24: Correlation matrix right hand variables Farm Account data. 
 
Assumption (A4) states that the expected value of the residual should be zero conditional on 
all the explanatory variables. In order to check this I have calculated the mean of the residuals 
in the data. The calculations give a mean of 0.0045, which is approximately zero, and the 
assumption is met. I have also applied the Kernel density estimate (pdf) of my residuals to be 
overlaid with a normal density function. Residuals in our model seem to be approximately 
normally distributed so the assumption is met.  
 
Figure 6: Residuals of fitted regression investment buildings 
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To test the variance of residuals (A5) I have performed a post-regression Breusch-Pagan test 
for heteroscedasticity. The results are reported in the tables below and reveal a p-value of 
0.8351, indicating that we do not have heteroscedasticity. 
Table 25: Heteroscedasticity test 
 
 
A(6) When there is a lagged dependent variable the Durbin-Watson test statistic is biased and 
I have therefore used Durbin’s alternative test for autocorrelation and confirmed the results 
with the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation. Both tests reveal that 
there is no statistical evidence of autocorrelation.  
Table 26: Autocorrelation test 
 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.8351
         chi2(1)      =     0.04
         Variables: fitted values of Investment
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1                0.015               1                   0.9038
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. estat bgodfrey
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1                0.010               1                   0.9214
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Durbin's alternative test for autocorrelation
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